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Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on efficiency measures of banks from six countries in East 
Asia. We use a two-stage approach to study the post-crisis period 1999-2004. 
We first estimate technical efficiencies using Data Envelopment Analysis and 
test for cross country differences. Efficiency scores are relatively high for 
South Korea and relatively low for the Philippines. We then investigate the 
link between ownership structure and efficiency controlling for various factors 
such as size, risk and the economic environment. We find that efficiency 
scores are higher for banks which are held by minority private shareholders 
and banks that are foreign-owned.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The financial crisis that hit Southeast Asia in 1997 raised various issues regarding the 
efficiency and the safety of local banking industries. After the crisis, bank regulators 
implemented several measures to reform the banking system with the aim of providing 
efficient banking services to the economy on a sustainable basis (Garcia, 1997). First, some 
governments decided to avoid closure of distressed banks by recapitalizing them. This process 
was accompanied by changes in management, ownership and governance. Second, Asian 
governments also avoided closure of banks by encouraging or even forcing safe banks to 
merge with distressed banks (Hawkins and Turner, 1999; Hawkins and Mihaljek, Gelos and 
Roldós, 2001; 2004). This consolidation process contributed to restore the financial viability 
of distressed banks even if it is not clear whether merging a weak bank and a strong bank, can 
actually create a strong bank (Hawkins and Turner, 1999). However, such interventions could 
still be more cost-effective than a government bailout or takeover. Third, Asian governments 
have facilitated the access of foreign investors in order to import international best practice 
and technological benefits (Choi and Clovutivat, 2004). Finally, many other restructuring 
processes were also implemented such as the replacement of underperforming bank managers 
and revision of managerial incentives. 
 This bank restructuring programme, which began almost immediately after the crisis 
in 1997 and which lasted until the early 2000s, modified the ownership structure and the 
governance of banks. This paper investigates the implications of such policies on the 
efficiency of commercial banks in East Asia during the post-crisis period 1999-2004. The 
countries examined in this paper are Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Thailand. Except for Hong Kong, all these financial systems have long been 
dominated by commercial banks with extensive branch network which have been the most 
affected by the Asian financial crisis in 1997 (Laeven, 1999).  Drake et al. (2006) however 
note that banks in Hong Kong also sharply suffered during the Asian financial crisis in 1997-
1998 as it coincided with a local property market crash resulting in depressed profits and 
increased bad debts. Hence, the common experience of the six countries is a unique feature to 
assess the implications of the restructuring process that took place after the crisis.  
 Previous studies on emerging countries which have analyzed the impact of 
restructuring programs on bank efficiency do not provide conclusive results. Papers which 
have studied the relationship between foreign bank entry and efficiency in transition countries 
find mixed results (Claessens et al., 2001; Fries and Taci, 2002; Bonin et al., 2005). Unite and 
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Sullivan (2003) show that foreign entry in the banking market in the Philippines corresponds 
to an improvement in operating efficiencies, but with a deterioration in the quality of loan 
portfolios. The studies which examine the link between bank ownership and efficiency, 
especially in transition economies, also provide mixed results (Grigorian and Manole, 2002; 
Yildrim and Philippatos, 2002; Fries and Taci, 2005; Bonin et al., 2005). For Asian countries, 
Laeven (1999) examines the risk factors and efficiency of banks using Data Envelopment 
Analysis, applied to the pre-crisis period 1992-1996 to predict which banks were restructured 
after the crisis of 1997. His findings show that state-owned and foreign-owned banks as well 
as Korean and Malaysian banks took little risk relative to other banks, while family-owned 
and company-owned banks and Indonesian and Philippine banks were among the highest risk 
takers. Williams and Nguyen (2005) focus on the link between bank performance and 
governance for five East Asian countries (Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and 
Thailand) between 1990 and 2003.  Their findings show that, as a result of bank privatization 
programs, banks selected for domestic mergers and acquisitions (M&As) exhibited relatively 
low rank order profit efficiency before the governance change, which improved in the short 
term but deteriorated in the long-term implying a temporary efficiency gain. Their results 
suggest that the benefits of domestic M&As are realized in terms of technical developments, 
which determine productivity rather than managerial performance. They also find a 
considerable improvement in rank order technical change and productivity in the short term 
after M&As, which was maintained in the long-term. On the whole their conclusions tend to 
support bank privatization and reject state ownership although their findings suggest that the 
potential benefits of foreign ownership may take a long time to be realized.  
 This paper extends the existing literature in three directions.  First, the paper tests 
whether banks perform differently across countries during the post crisis period to focus on 
the implications of the restructuring process in the region. Our data therefore cover the 1999-
2004 period. Second, we use a more detailed breakdown of bank ownership than in previous 
studies (that is state-owned, foreign-owned, private-owned, institutional investor-owned and 
widely-held). Third, two efficiency measures – technical efficiency and efficiency of revenue 
creation – are investigated in relation to bank characteristics such as ownership structure 
measures, size, risk indicators and environmental variables. We hence focus on efficiency 
measures consistent for institutions mainly involved in traditional intermediation activities 
(loans and deposits) but also on measures which capture more accurately expanded bank 
activities such as the provision of services (commission- and fee-based) and trading activities.  
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 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology used 
to compute efficiency scores, as well as our dataset and the obtained results. Section 3 
investigates the determinants of efficiency scores and section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Efficiency estimates 
 
2.1. Method 
 
In this study, we use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) with variable returns to 
scale (VRS) to compute efficiency scores. The choice of VRS over constant return to scale 
(CRS) is justified on the grounds that not all decision-making units (DMUs) are operating at 
an optimal scale due to imperfect competition and financial constraints. As we assume 
variable returns to scale, we can use two approaches to measure efficiency: the input-oriented 
(input minimization) approach and the output-oriented (revenue model) approach
1
. These two 
models will estimate exactly the same frontier and then by definition will identify the same 
set of efficient DMUs. But these two models will differ for the efficiency measures associated 
with the inefficient DMUs.  
We use the intermediation approach in both input-oriented and output-oriented 
models. The intermediation approach, originally proposed by Sealey and Lindley (1977), is 
appropriate when banks operate as independent entities
2
 (Bos and Kool, 2006). Moreover, the 
intermediation approach which takes interest expenses into account may be more appropriate 
to evaluate financial institutions as they represent in general at least half of total costs (Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997).  
In the input-oriented model (Model 1), we assume that the main role of banks is to 
distribute funds between depositors and borrowers at the lowest costs. We therefore consider 
as inputs personnel expenses, interest expenses and other operating expenses, and as outputs 
net loans, total securities and other earning assets.  We follow Hughes, Mester and Moon 
(2000) and assume that interest is an input (expense), which is consistent with the input 
minimization objective of Model 1. Total securities include equity investments by the banks 
while other earning assets include physical property and premises that are used in revenue 
generation like safekeeping transactions. The specification of Model 1 is as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
1 The input-oriented model and the output oriented-model provide the same value of efficiency scores under 
CRS but not when assuming VRS. 
2 On the contrary, studies which consider bank branch efficiencies use the production approach.  
 4
Model 1: DEA VRS Input-Oriented  
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where θ is the inefficiency score, xij and yij are the amount of the ith input consumed and the 
amount of the r
th
 output generated by the j
th
 bank, respectively.  The index n refers to number 
of bank observations, m equals the three inputs (personnel expenses, interest expenses and 
other operating expenses) and s refers to the three outputs (net loans, total securities and other 
earning assets).   
As non-traditional bank activities, such as commission- and fee-based activities and 
trading activities have become more important, the exclusion of these items may bias 
efficiency measures (Berger and Mester, 1997). We use Model 2, which is an output 
maximization problem, to account for bank activity diversification. We follow Sturn and 
Williams (2004, 2006) and Avkirian (1999, 2000) by considering the interest expenses and 
the non interest expenses as inputs and the net interest income and the non interest income as 
outputs. Model 2 is specified as follows: 
 
Model 2: DEA VRS Output Oriented-Revenue Creation 
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where is (1 )φ−  the efficiency score, xij and yij are the amount of the ith input consumed and 
the amount of the r
th
 output generated by the j
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 bank, respectively.  The index n refers to 
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number of bank observations, m equals the two inputs (interest expenses and non interest 
expenses) and s refers to the two outputs (net interest income and non interest income).   
 
 2.2. Data 
 
The dataset used in this study contains observations from 1999 to 2004 on the 
population of commercial banks in Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Thailand available in the Bankscope database which reports published 
financial statements from financial institutions worldwide. To maintain consistency across 
countries, only commercial banks are included in the analysis, which gives us 334 banks. We 
delete banks with less than five years of time series observations
3
. The final sample consists 
of 80 Asian banks (17 banks in Hong Kong, 12 banks in Indonesia, 13 banks in South Korea, 
20 banks in Malaysia, 12 banks in the Philippines, and 6 banks in Thailand) yielding 358 
bank-year observations (see Table A1 in the appendix for details on the distribution of the 
sample). In as much as we want a panel data approach to track possible technical changes or 
shifts in the frontier utilizing DEA, attrition reduces the number of cross-sections and to 
include only surviving banks might lead to survivor bias. The period 1999 to 2004 is chosen 
because the effect of the exogenous shocks to the region (Asian financial crisis) has passed 
and will no longer distort the estimates. If too short a period is chosen, inefficiency might not 
average out.  If too long a period is chosen, the bank’s efficiency score become less 
meaningful because of possible changes in management and other events. Berger and Mester 
(1997) concur with De Young (1997) that a six-year period reasonably balances the concerns 
of having too short or too long a period. The information for the country environmental level 
variables are sourced from the Asian Development Bank. 
Table A2 provides some descriptive statistics of our dataset. Deposits are the main 
resource of the banks in our sample (75.62%) and loans are their main assets (53.12%). On 
average, interest income and non interest income represent respectively around 69% and 29% 
of their total income. Therefore, the banks in our sample include both traditional and non-
traditional banking activities. The total capital ratio is equal to 16.53% on average showing 
that, on the whole, banks are well capitalized and have build up capital buffers over the period 
1999 to 2004. The level of non-performing loans differs significantly between countries. The 
ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans remains relatively high after the crisis period for 
                                                 
3 This condition enables us to accurately compute the standard deviations of some variables. 
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the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand. Conversely, this same ratio is relatively low for Hong 
Kong, South Korea and Indonesia.  
In our study, we code the ownership structure based on the stockholder information 
contained in the BankScope database. For banks with missing information, we have looked at 
the individual bank’s websites to determine the appropriate classification. Majority ownership 
is defined as owning over 33% of the stockholders’ equity, following Laeven (1999). We 
consider a more detailed breakdown of bank ownership than in previous studies. We examine 
similar ownership forms as in Laeven (1999) but we also take institutional investors into 
account and hence consider five categories of ownership defined as
4
: (i) state-owned, shares 
being held by government institutions and corporations (9 banks); (ii) foreign-owned, shares 
being held by parent bank in foreign country or the bank being a foreign subsidiary (17 
banks); (iii) private, shares being held by private companies as well as family-owned (35 
banks); (iv) institutional investor-owned, shares being held by insurance companies and 
pension funds (11 banks); and, (v) widely-held, shares held by individual shareholders with 
stakes ranging from 5 to 33 percent (8 banks). 
 
 2.3. Results 
 
Model 1 (Equation 1) and Model 2 (Equation 2) are used to calculate technical efficiency, 
denoted respectively TE1 and TE2
5
. The technical efficiency scores we obtain are displayed 
in Table 1, as well as the technical efficiency scores from CRS (CRSTE1 and CRSTE2) and 
the technical efficiency scores from VRS (VRSTE1 and VRSTE2) used to calculate TE1 and 
TE2
6
.  
We use a Spearman rank test to compare the efficiency scores computed with Equation 1 
and Equation 2. We find a Spearman correlation coefficient greater than 0.95. The null 
hypothesis of independency of each measure of efficiency is therefore rejected. In other 
words, banks with a higher level of efficiency obtained with Model 1 are also those exhibiting 
a higher level of efficiency with Model 2. We therefore do not find different results when 
computing efficiency scores with Model 1, which mainly considers traditional banking 
activities, and Model 2 which considers both traditional and non-traditional banking activities.    
 
 
                                                 
4 Among the 80 banks in our sample, none was classified into two categories of ownership simultaneously. 
Otherwise, we would have deleted such banks from our sample.  
5 We use the DEAP Version 2.1 Computer Program by Tim Coelli to solve the linear programming problem.  
6 TE1 is equal to the ratio of CSRTE1 to VRSTE1 and TE2 is equal to the ratio of CSRTE2 to VRSTE2. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Technical Efficiency scores computed with Equations 1 
(DEA VRS Input-Oriented) and 2 (DEA VRS Output-Oriented Revenue Creation) 
 Equation 1 (Model 1) Equation 2 (Model 2) 
 CRSTE1 VRSTE1 TE1 CRSTE2 VRSTE2 TE2 
 Full Sample (n=358) Full Sample (n=362) 
Mean 0.3590 0.4546 0.7790  0.4468  0.5283  0.8446 
Median 0.2420 0.3585 0.8850  0.4250  0.5015  0.8815 
Minimum 0.0110 0.0410 0.0960  0.0620  0.0690  0.2760 
Std. Dev. 0.3029 0.3278 0.2457  0.1878  0.1935  0.1580 
 Constant returns (n=49) Constant returns (n=18) 
Mean 0.7684 0.7685 0.9996  0.6255  0.6257  0.9998 
Median 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000  0.5380  0.5385  1.0000 
Minimum 0.0780 0.0790 0.9950  0.1490  0.1490  0.9990 
Std. Dev. 0.3499 0.3498 0.0010  0.3077  0.3076  0.0003 
 Increasing returns (n=220) Increasing returns (n=74) 
Mean 0.2264 0.3294 0.7219  0.4718  0.5058  0.9394 
Median 0.1630 0.2570 0.8340  0.4765  0.4975  0.9815 
Minimum 0.0110 0.0410 0.0960  0.0990  0.1000  0.3540 
Std. Dev. 0.1695 0.2566 0.2702  0.1821  0.1963  0.1117 
 Decreasing returns (n=89) Decreasing returns (n=270) 
Mean 0.4612 0.5911 0.7988  0.4280  0.5279  0.8083 
Median 0.4230 0.5590 0.8580  0.4105  0.4995  0.8160 
Minimum 0.0790 0.1300 0.2970  0.0620  0.0690  0.2760 
Std. Dev. 0.2481 0.3041 0.1663  0.1723  0.1818  0.1572 
By country 
Hong Kong 0.3794 0.4797 0.7749  0.5474  0.6579  0.8405 
Indonesia 0.2703 0.3909 0.7143  0.3829  0.4933  0.7744 
Korea 0.5236 0.5709 0.9185  0.3374  0.4551  0.8610 
Malaysia 0.3641 0.4389 0.8240  0.5050  0.5566  0.9079 
Philippines 0.1545 0.2952 0.5880  0.4668  0.5067  0.7143 
Thailand 0.4609 0.5940 0.8063  0.5272  0.5421  0.9589 
By year 
1999 0.3448 0.4484 0.7441  0.3595  0.4593  0.8037 
2000 0.5757 0.7039 0.8257  0.3759  0.4768  0.8008 
2001 0.3299 0.4150 0.7822  0.3966  0.4790  0.8264 
2002 0.2962 0.4261 0.7252  0.4664  0.5425  0.8572 
2003 0.3173 0.3746 0.8215  0.5168  0.5793  0.8904 
2004 0.3152 0.3867 0.7813  0.6251  0.6802  0.9182 
CRSTE = constant returns to scale; VRSTE = variable returns to scale; TE = technical efficiency. 
 
The literature distinguishes efficient banks as those exhibiting constant returns to scale 
and inefficient banks as those exhibiting variable (increasing and decreasing) returns to scale.  
The results highlight differences in the number of observations with increasing and decreasing 
returns to scale when we use an input oriented model (Model 1) or an output oriented model 
(Model 2).  
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We find that 49 and 18 observations respectively exhibit constant returns to scale for 
Model 1 and Model 2; 220 observations exhibit increasing returns to scale for Model 1 
whereas we only have 74 observations with increasing returns to scale when using Model 2; 
and 89 and 270 observations follow decreasing returns to scale respectively for Model 1 and 
for Model 2. The model specification is able to discriminate between efficient and inefficient 
banks as only 49 out of the 358 observations for the Model 1 and as only 18 out of 358 
observations for Model 2, or 14% and 5% respectively are within the efficient frontier. Paradi, 
Vela and Yang (2005) note that when 25 to 50% of the sample lies on the frontier, it might 
become a problem for management to improve operations relative to other banks. Overall, the 
percentage of banks in the sample that are considered as technically inefficient is, on average, 
equal to 86 for Model 1 and 84 for Model 2. For the increasing returns group to reach the 
level of the efficient group, technical efficiency has to be improved by 28% if we consider 
Model 1(TE1) and 6% if we consider Model 2 (TE2). Regarding the decreasing returns group, 
the level of efficiency has to be improved by around 20%, whether we consider TE1 or TE2. 
The results also indicate that, during the post-crisis period, banks generally enjoy increasing 
returns when we consider Model 1 (with 220 out of 358 or 61.45%), whereas we find that 
banks mainly face decreasing returns to scale when considering Model 2 (with 270 out of 358 
or 75.45%). Considering the pre-crisis period 1989-1996 for four ASEAN countries 
(Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines), Karim (2001), using a parametric 
approach and considering only traditional activities, finds that on average ASEAN banks 
enjoy increasing returns to scale. Our results indicate therefore that Asian banks continue to 
benefit from increasing returns after the crisis period if we consider efficiency scores 
computed with Model 1, which includes only traditional banking activities. On the contrary, 
we find that Asian banks mainly face decreasing returns to scale in the post-crisis period 
when we include both traditional and non-traditional banking activities.  
 
We further use the parametric and nonparametric tests of Banker (1993) to test if the 
efficient group (constant returns) is different from the inefficient group (increasing and 
decreasing returns). The non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test is applied as we 
maintain no assumptions on the probability distribution of inefficiency in equation 1. The KS 
test statistic is given by the maximum vertical distance between ( )( )jGF θˆln1  and ( )( )jGF θˆln2 , 
the empirical distributions of ( )jθˆln  for groups G1 and G2, respectively.  The KS test tries to 
determine if two datasets differ significantly, and the maximum difference between the 
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cumulative distributions is given by the D statistic. The D statistic, by construction, takes 
values between 0 and 1 and a high value for this statistic is indicative of significant 
differences in inefficiency between two groups.  
We find the D statistic to be 0.9472 and 0.9797 respectively for TE1 (Model 1) and 
TE2 (Model 2), with a corresponding p value of 0.000, indicating a highly significant 
difference between the groups (see Table 2). To check for robustness, we also test the 
efficient group against the two inefficient subgroups separately, and find the D statistics close 
to 1 with p values close to 0 for both Models 1 and 2, indicating highly significant differences 
in the efficiency scores.   
 
Table 2. Comparison of returns to scale (TE1/TE2) between efficient and inefficient groups 
 
 Cumulative Distribution Score Null Hypothesis of  
No Difference 
Model 1 (TE1) 
CRS vs IRS and DRS D=0.9472*** Rejected 
CRS vs IRS D=0.9387*** Rejected 
CRS vs DRS D=0.9775*** Rejected 
Model 2 (TE2) 
CRS vs IRS and DRS D=0.9797*** Rejected 
CRS vs IRS D=0.9324*** Rejected 
CRS vs DRS D=0.9926*** Rejected 
*** indicates significance at p<0.01. CRS  = constant returns to scale; IRS =  increasing return to scale ; 
and DRS = decreasing return to scale. 
 
 
The KS test is a robust test that only focuses on the relative distribution of the data. 
Hence the value of the D statistic is not affected by scale changes. In Figure 1 in the appendix, 
we can see that the KS percentile plot of the sets of efficiency scores is strikingly distinct. The 
efficient (CRS) scores plot are scrunched as a vertical line on the far right side of the graph 
while the inefficiency scores (IRS and DRS) appear as upwardly diagonal, indicating that on 
the whole, the efficiency scores are not likely to be normally nor log-normally distributed.
7
    
 
We also check if technical efficiency scores are different across countries. We use the 
pair-wise KS test. In general, the results suggest that there exist differences in technical 
                                                 
7 Percentile plot is a better estimate of the distribution function and the use of probability scales allows us to see 
how normal the data are. Normally distributed and log-normal data will plot as a straight line on probability-
scaled and probability-log scaled axes, respectively. The KS tests reported that the datasets on efficiency scores 
are unlikely to be normally or log normally (exponentially) distributed, hence the generality that the datasets are 
non-parametric and distribution free. This justifies the choice of the D statistic over the Student’s t test in 
determining the differences between groups of banks. 
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efficiency scores of banks across the six Asian countries under study (see Table 3). Indonesia 
and the Philippines reach the lowest average technical efficiency scores (Tables 2 and 3), both 
for Models 1 and 2. This result is consistent with Kwan’s (2003) finding on Philippine banks 
exhibiting the highest per unit labor and per unit physical costs. South Korea averages the 
highest overall technical efficiency score for Model 1, while Thailand averages the highest 
overall technical efficiency score for Model 2. Relatively high and statistically significant 
difference is registered between South Korea and Indonesia (D=0.4977), and South Korea 
and the Philippines (D=0.5873) when we consider Model 1. For Model 2, we find strong 
significant differences between Indonesia and Thailand (D=0.6257) as well as between South 
Korea and Thailand (D=0.6232).  
 
Table 3 Pair-wise KS Test for country differences in Efficiency scores 
 Hong Kong Indonesia South-Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
Model 1 
Hong Kong 1.000      
Indonesia 0.2198 1.000     
South-Korea 0.3497*** 0.4977*** 1.000    
Malaysia 0.1927 0.3208*** 0.2064* 1.000   
Philippines 0.3649*** 0.2583** 0.5873*** 0.4222*** 1.000  
Thailand 0.1452 0.3118** 0.2381** 0.1215 0.4140*** 1.000 
Model 2 
Hong Kong 1.000      
Indonesia 0.2337 1.000     
South-Korea 0.2493** 0.1612 1.000    
Malaysia 0.3015*** 0.4634*** 0.5134*** 1.000   
Philippines 0.2700** 0.4525*** 0.4669*** 0.0732 1.000  
Thailand 0.4296*** 0.6257*** 0.6232*** 0.2513 0.2516 1.000 
***, **, * indicate significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively. 
 
 
 We finally check if technical efficiency scores differ with ownership categories (Table 
4). We use pair wise mean tests to compare technical efficiency scores between our five 
categories of owner
8
. When we consider technical efficiency scores computed with Model 1 
(input minimization), we find that banks which are held by minority shareholders (widely-
held) exhibit higher levels of efficiency relatively to other banks across the Asian region 
during the period 1999-2004. We also find that foreign-owned banks have higher levels of 
efficiency if we consider Model 2 (revenue creation).  
                                                 
8 We are not able to use KS tests as previously because we do not have enough information for each category of 
ownership. The mean tests are available from the authors on request. 
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Table 4.  Technical efficiency and ownership structure  
 
 Foreign-owned State-owned Private-owned Institutional 
investor-owned 
Widely-held 
Model 1, TE1 
Mean 0.856 0.847 0.842 0.846 0.918 
Std 0.073 0.061 0.069 0.064 0.068 
Max 0.961 0.963 0.956 0.939 0.980 
Min 0.714 0.758 0.697 0.748 0.776 
Model 1, TE2 
Mean 0.906 0.866 0.824 0.799 0.891 
Std 0.097 0.135 0.112 0.162 0.090 
Max 0.991 0.998 0.998 0.984 0.993 
Min 0.736 0.633 0.535 0.536 0.762 
TE1= technical efficiency scores computed with Model 1;  TE2= technical efficiency scores computed with 
Model 2. 
  
 To further investigate the relationship between bank efficiency and ownership, the 
efficiency scores generated from Equations 1 and 2 are used as dependent variables in 
multiple regressions to determine if bank characteristics and country-specific environmental 
variables can explain differences in efficiency. 
 
3. Determinants of efficiency scores 
 
3.1 Regression analysis 
To investigate the factors that might explain differences in efficiency levels, we focus 
on the ownership structure of banks along with a number of control variables such as bank 
size, leverage and asset risk. Total assets is used as a proxy for bank size. We also introduce 
the ratio of equity to total assets to capture the quality of bank management and risk 
preferences. We expect a negative coefficient as well-capitalized banks reflect both a higher 
management quality and a higher aversion to risk taking. These banks should be more cost 
efficient in producing banking outputs. We further include the ratio of loan loss provisions to 
net loans as a proxy of output quality. The literature provides mixed results on the expected 
sign of the coefficient of this variable. The coefficient can be negative if banks spend more 
resources on credit underwriting and loan monitoring, and consequently fewer problem loans 
at the expense of higher operating costs (Mester, 1996). The coefficient of this variable can be 
positive if banks have high ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans, indicating poor loan 
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quality that calls for higher operating costs related to credit risk and loan loss management 
(Berger and DeYoung, 1997).  
We also consider another measure of output quality, which is the standard deviation of 
the return on assets (ROA). This broader measure of asset risk might be more appropriate for 
Model 1 where we consider as outputs not only net loans but also total securities and other 
earning assets. This measure of risk should also be applicable for Model 2 which accounts for 
traditional and non-traditional banking activities.  
Regarding our ownership structure variables, we build five different dummy variables 
referring to the nature of ownership. We consider that there is a majority ownership when an 
owner holds at least 33% of the stockholders’ equity. As the owners are classified in five 
categories, we create the following five dummy variables which takes the value of one when 
ownership is at least equal to 33% of the equity and 0 otherwise: state-owned, foreign-owned, 
private-owned, institutional investor-owned and widely-held. The different types of bank 
ownership refer to different forms of governance as discussed in Berger et al. (2005). Studies 
of U.S. corporations typically use the governance term to refer to the methods shareholders 
use to reduce managerial agency cost, such as board composition, voting rules, or stakes by 
managers. Ownership is assumed to be related to a bank’s performance because the incentives 
for managers to efficiently allocate resources might differ under different ownership types or 
arrangements.   
We then estimate the following cross-section equations to determine which factors are 
efficiency drivers: 
i i i iEff  = BankChar  + ßOwnership   + α η  
where the dependant variable Eff is the average efficiency score computed either with Model 
1 or with Model 2. BankChar is the vector of bank characteristics and Ownership is the vector 
of ownership variables. α  and ß are the coefficients of the estimates and η  is the disturbance 
term. 
 Because the efficiency scores generated by DEA models are dependant on each other, 
we use bootstrap estimators to calculate standard errors of our estimates (Xue and Harker, 
1999; Casu and Molyneux, 2003). The DEA efficiency score is not an absolute efficiency 
index, but a relative efficiency score. The assumption of independence within the sample is 
therefore violated and conventional OLS is invalid. The results throughout this paper are 
obtained from 10 000 bootstrap iterations. The estimation results are displayed in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Determinants of Efficiency Scores (Bootstrap estimators) 
 TE1 TE2  
 
Intercept 0.859*** 
(34.236) 
0.849*** 
(34.798) 
0.810*** 
(22.927) 
0.829*** 
(17.584) 
Total assets, average 0.0006* 
(1.672) 
0.0006* 
(1.689) 
-0.0005* 
(-1.990) 
-0.0005* 
(-1.807) 
Total equity/total assets, 
average  
-0.003* 
(-1.791) 
-0.002 
(-1.261) 
0.248 
(1.293) 
0.293 
(1.297) 
Loan loss provisions/net loans, 
average 
0.003 
(0.563) 
- 0.006 
(1.174) 
- 
Standard deviation of ROA - 0.012* 
(1.723) 
- -0.003 
(-0.536) 
Foreign-owned  0.003 
(0.154) 
-0.005 
(0.018) 
0.071** 
(2.271) 
0.092*** 
(2.869) 
Institutional investor owned
  
0.006 
(0.227) 
-0.003 
(-0.113) 
-0.042 
(-0.795) 
-0.052 
(-1.005) 
State-owned  -0.011 
(-0.522) 
-0.011 
(-0.491) 
0.033 
(0.727) 
0.034 
(0.742) 
Widely-held 
 
0.077*** 
(2.815) 
0.068** 
(2.310) 
0.088** 
(2.507) 
0.079* 
(1.885) 
Number of observations 78 71 71 63 
R2 0.2440 0.2956 0.2718 0.2912 
t-statistic in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively. 
TE1 and TE2 are respectively technical efficiency from Model 1 (input minimization) and Model 2 (revenue 
model). Foreign-owned, Institutional investor-owned, State-owned, and Widely-held are dummy variables.  
 
 
Regarding efficiency as measured in Model 1, we find that total assets, as a proxy for 
size, significantly and positively influences technical efficiency. Large banks are on average 
more efficient than smaller banks if we consider the input minimization model, which is 
consistent with Kwan (2006) and Drake et al. (2006). We also find a significant negative sign 
for the equity to total assets variable, but only at the 10% level. The coefficient associated 
with the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans is not significant and therefore loan quality 
does not seem to alter efficiency. However, the coefficient of the broader measure of asset 
risk (standard deviation of ROA) is positive and significant, though at the 10% level only. 
Regarding the ownership structure variables, only the “widely-held” variable is significant 
and positively related to technical efficiency. 
 In the case of Model 2, bank size (total assets) has a negative significant coefficient. 
Unlike in Model 1, this result indicates that small banks are less efficient than large banks. In 
Model 2, inputs and output measures are revenue focused. It is therefore expected that Model 
2 might yield different results because efficiency estimates are sensitive to input and output 
specification (Berger et al, 1993). The coefficient associated to the equity to total assets 
variable is not significant. As such, there appears to be no relationship between the degree of 
leverage and efficiency. We also find that the variable “foreign-owned” has a significant and 
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positive impact on bank revenue creation efficiency.  The results from Model 2 also confirm 
that banks which are held by minority private shareholders (“widely-held”) have higher 
efficiency scores. 
 
3.2. Robustness checks and discussion of results 
We check the robustness of our results by considering environmental variables as 
determinants of efficiency scores. The objective of incorporating such variables is to associate 
variation in bank performance with variation in the exogenous variables characterizing the 
environment in which bank production and intermediation occurs. The exogenous variables 
influence performance not by influencing efficiency, with which they are assumed to be 
uncorrelated, but by influencing the structure of the technical and cost efficient frontier. 
Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) underline three categories of environmental variables that 
influence cost efficiency as a guide for cross-country studies: i) those that describe the main 
macroeconomic conditions which determine the banking product demand characteristics; ii) 
the variables that describe the structure and regulation of the banking industry, and; iii) those 
that characterize the accessibility of banking services.  
In this study, we account for macroeconomic conditions by including the real GDP 
growth rate (GDP) as in Pastor (1999)
9
 which falls under the first category as prescribed by 
Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000). We also introduce the difference between the loans and 
savings deposit interest rates (SPREAD) as a proxy for the structure and competition in the 
different national banking systems. A smaller gap between the loans and savings rates 
suggests a more competitive environment. Finally, we introduce the coefficient of variation of 
the country’s exchange rate with respect to the US dollar (FOREX), which should capture the 
volatility of the local currency. 
We find that environmental variables are on the whole not significant (see Table A3 in 
Appendix). The only significant variable is GDP with a positive influence on technical 
efficiency, when considering Model 1 (TE1) with the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans 
taken as a proxy of output quality. Our results therefore highlight that the factors that 
influence efficiency do not depend on the economic environment. Regarding the ownership 
structure variables, our results remain the same. We find that the variable “foreign-owned” 
has a significant and positive impact on bank efficiency but only for revenue creation 
                                                 
9 Pastor (1999) also introduces the use of unemployment rate and inflation rate as environmental variables. We 
do not use these two variables in our regressions as they are strongly correlated with the real GDP growth rate 
and the interest rate spread.   
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efficiency (TE2), as previously. Our results also show that “widely-held” variable is 
significant and positively related to technical efficiency, but only at the 10% when 
considering TE2.   
 
 The results of our econometric investigation show that the differences in efficiency 
scores cannot be explained by the economic environment but can be explained by bank 
specific characteristics, namely ownership arrangements. We find that the relationship with 
size is positive and significant when we consider an input minimization objective (Model 1) 
and negative when we consider revenue creation (Model 2). We do not find a strong 
relationship between bank leverage and efficiency levels, and loan quality does not appear to 
determine efficiency levels. To a lesser extent, risk taking is a significant and positive driver 
of technical efficiency when an input minimization objective is considered. 
Regarding the ownership structure, we find that banks which are held by minority 
shareholders exhibit higher levels of efficiency over the post-crisis period. This result is not 
consistent with the findings of Laeven (1999) showing that widely-owned banks experienced 
a decrease in efficiency relatively to other banks across the Asian region during the period 
1992-1996. Based on the same ownership definition as proposed by Laeven (1999), our 
results highlight that for the post-crisis period, Asian banks which do not exhibit a 
concentrated ownership have higher efficiency levels. Therefore, our findings do not support 
the hypothesis of a positive impact of concentration on efficiency. We also find that foreign-
owned banks are more efficient than other domestic banks when we consider revenue 
creation. This is consistent with Laeven (1999) who highlights that foreign-banks showed an 
increase in efficiency relative to other banks.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was to assess the implications of the restructuring process 
imposed on banking industries in Southeast Asia after the 1997 financial crisis. Within a 
regional approach involving six countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Thailand) we find that Asian banks generally benefit from increasing returns 
after the crisis period. However, we observe persistent differences in efficiencies across 
countries. Efficiency scores are relatively high for South Korea and relatively low for 
Thailand and the Philippines. The results of our econometric investigation show that such 
differences can be explained by bank specific characteristics. Efficiency is driven by bank 
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size and to a lesser extent by risk taking. Our main findings, which are robust, are that banks 
owned by minority private shareholders and by foreign investors appear to be more efficient 
than other banks during the post-crisis period. Therefore, unlike some studies that report a 
positive effect of ownership concentration on efficiency in the same region during the pre-
crisis period (Laeven (1999), our results suggest that reforms aiming to improve corporate 
governance might currently be beneficial to minority shareholders. Our second result 
regarding the role of foreign investors is consistent with previous studies. Hence, our findings 
imply that the entry and growing involvement of foreign investors is still beneficial for the 
efficiency of the banking industry in this region.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1: KS-Test Comparison Percentile Plot (Model 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1. Distribution of Sample (number of observations by country and by year) 
  Hong Kong     Indonesia     South Korea     Malaysia         Philippines        Thailand        Total 
1999       15     0         10          18                 12   3       58 
2000       11                  0         13          15                 11   4     54 
2001        8                12         12          16                 11   6     65 
2002        8   12         12          15                 10   6     63 
2003        8   12         12          13                   9   6     60 
2004        8   12         12          13                   7   6     58 
Total      58                48         71          90                 60   31    
358 
Table A2. Descriptive Statistics for the Panel of 80 Asian Commercial Banks, on average over the period 1999-2004 
  ROA   ROE   TA  LOAN DEPOSIT SECURITY EQUITY TCR EXPENSES NPL Int_TR OOE NII NNII 
Full Sample (n=358)               
  Mean          0,72      6,48       18 073 213 53,12 75,62 19,45 8,83 16,53 0,94 10.76 4,57 0,88 68.73 29.22 
  Standard Deviation         1,76     46,74      38 068 828 0,14 0,09 0,13 5,10 9,17 0,44 9.11 2,54 0,75 28.31 20.61 
 Hong Kong (n=58)               
  Mean          0,93     10,57      34 098 731 50,98 74,11 14,66 10,94 22,25 0,75 5.83 3,37 0,59 73.38 26.61 
  Standard Deviation         0,74      8,22       75 197 145 0,12 0,12 0,12 3,78 14,43 0,27 9.77 1,92 0,18 16.34 16.33 
 Indonesia (n=48)                
  Mean          1,56      2,67        7 087 021  39,92 79,60 33,84 8,84 20,03 1,24 6.16 8,22 0,29 77.87 16.17 
  Standard Deviation         1,27     94,27       7 795 652  0,14 0,06 0,16 4,24 8,81 0,73 5.72 2,73 0,33 46.40 32.15 
 South Korea (n=71)               
  Mean          0,07      1,13       42 096 997 59,80 74,72 22,25 4,13 10,16 0,77 5.08 4,79 0,64 66.07 33.92 
  Standard Deviation         1,55     42,95      36 816 438 0,07 0,07 0,08 2,31 6,55 0,23 7.77 1,50 0,40 14.28 14.27 
 Malaysia (n=90)                
  Mean          0,77     14,39       8 010 051  57,29 75,94 19,62 8,31 15,40 0,75 13.49 3,73 0,46 66.49 30.75 
  Standard Deviation         1,65     35,69       9 699 452  0,15 0,07 0,09 4,86 7,83 0,17 7.67 2,42 0,17 27.26 11.21 
 Philippines (n=60)               
  Mean          0,74      3,52        3 056 757  51,08 70,53 8,65 13,70 17,47 1,33 16.06 4,71 2,13 59.93 38.83 
  Standard Deviation         1,41     16,65       2 940 187  0,09 0,09 0,09 4,66 6,31 0,26 8.36 1,54 0,50 17.12 14.60 
 Thailand (n=31)                
  Mean          0,30   0,21       8 358 389  55,11 83,78 20,09 7,70 14,68 1,04 12.12 2,84 1,69 65.01 34.98 
  Standard Deviation         3,67     54,31       6 345 847  0,18 0,07 0,16 4,05 3,23 0,60 9.08 1,25 0,61 13.41 13.40 
Variable definitions (all ratios are expressed in percentages): ROA = return on average assets; ROE = return on average equity; TA : total assets in millions of US dollars; 
LOANS = net loans/total assets; DEPOSIT = deposits/total assets; SECURITY= securities /Total assets; EQUITY = equity/total assets; TCR = Total capital ratio; 
EXPENSES = personnel expenses/total assets; NPL = non performing loans/gross loans; Int_TR = interest expenses/total resources; OOE = operating expenses/Total assets; 
NII = net interest income/net operating income;   NNII = net non interest income/ net operating income. 
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Table A3: Regression of Efficiency Scores with ownership structure and environmental 
variables (Bootstrap estimators) 
 
 TE1 TE2  
 
Intercept 0.662*** 
(6.373) 
0.715*** 
(6.113) 
0.601*** 
(3.204) 
0.763*** 
(3.458) 
Total assets, average 0.0006* 
(1.917) 
0.0001* 
(1.702) 
-0.0005 
(-1.501) 
-0.0002 
(-1.492) 
Total equity/total assets, 
average  
-0.002 
(-0.960) 
-0.002 
(-0.838) 
0.336 
(1.593) 
0.305 
(1.150) 
Loan loss provisions/net loans, 
average 
-0.000 
(-0.009) 
- 0.006 
(1.193) 
- 
Standard deviation of ROA - 0.010 
(1.471) 
- -0.004 
(-0.554) 
Foreign-owned  -0.00 
(-0.211) 
-0.005 
(-0.263) 
0.064* 
(1.905) 
0.093*** 
(2.833) 
Institutional investor owned
  
-0.007 
(-0.227) 
-0.010 
(-0.369) 
-0.499 
(-0.775) 
-0.044 
(-0.760) 
State-owned  -0.027 
(-1.176) 
-0.020 
(-0.842) 
0.038 
(0.780) 
0.038 
(0.815) 
Widely-held 
 
0.063*** 
(2.230) 
0.060** 
(1.961) 
0.085* 
(1.914) 
0.082* 
(1.847) 
GDP  0.031** 
(1.977) 
0.020 
(1.128) 
0.033 
(1.073) 
0.008 
(0.244) 
FOREX  0.509 
(2.463) 
0.302 
(1.316) 
0.156 
(0.411) 
0.005 
(0.013) 
SPREAD 0.004 
(1.081) 
0.003 
(0.848) 
0.006 
(0.872) 
0.004 
(0.534) 
Number of observations 71 71 63 63 
R2 0.3169 0.3248 0.2842 0.3025 
t-statistic in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively. 
TE1 and TE2 are respectively technical efficiency from model 1 (input minimization) and model 2  
(revenue model). Foreign-owned, institutional investor-owned, state-owned, and widely-held are dummy 
variables.  GDP= real GDP growth rate; FOREX= coefficient of variation of the country’s 
exhange rate measured in US dollars; SPREAD = difference between loan and saving deposit 
interest rate. 
 
 
 
 
